On July 8, Alexey Ivanov, Director of the BRICS Competition Law and Policy Centre, delivered a report titled “Architects of the Grain Value Chain: ABCD Traders or Antitrust Authorities?” at the 9th United Nations Conference on Competition and Consumer Protection, held from July 7 to 11 in Geneva, Switzerland.
In his report, Ivanov explored how grain trade has emerged as a critical domain for shaping a new antitrust policy paradigm grounded in the analysis of global value chains. He emphasized that, with population growth and the increasing global turnover of grain, private actors have entered the market, assuming — at least in part — the functions traditionally held by the state in ensuring food security.
Under these conditions, competition policy must transcend its conventional focus on protecting market rivalry and instead prioritize the sustainable functioning of markets. This perspective is echoed in the final declaration of the 17th BRICS Summit, where the leaders underscored the importance of transparency, resilience, and inclusiveness in food markets, and called for addressing these issues through the lens of global value chains.

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In discussing enforcement policy, Alexey Ivanov referred to the merger of major grain traders Bunge and Viterra, which was approved by antitrust authorities in several jurisdictions without the imposition of measures to limit the merged entity’s influence over the global grain value chain. He noted that while some regulators voiced concerns about the potential impact of the deal on domestic pricing, no binding commitments were introduced to mitigate these risks.
"Thus, large corporations are becoming central nodes within global systems, raising fundamental questions about how to conceptualize the form of power they wield in structuring value chains. This power, in many respects, resembles that of digital ecosystem operators — major technology firms that have already drawn the attention of competition regulators worldwide,"
emphasized the Director of the BRICS Centre.

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In the report “From Fields to Futures: A BRICS Perspective on Competition in the Global Grain Value Chain,” prepared by experts from the BRICS Centre as part of the BRICS Working Group for the Research of Competition Issues in Food Markets, the authors attempt to analyze the emerging ecosystemic form of power in the grain sector. Particular attention is given to key elements such as financialization, which plays a pivotal role for global grain traders, digitalization, and the development of specialized platforms like Covantis, designed for data collection and exchange. The report also explores processes of corporate ownership concentration and virtual integration, which further consolidate the control of leading actors over value chains.
The full version of the report will be presented at the 9th BRICS International Conference on Competition, scheduled to take place in September in Cape Town, South Africa.
In conclusion, Alexey Ivanov emphasized the growing demand for closer cooperation among BRICS countries in the field of antitrust law and policy. This need is particularly pressing in the contemporary digital environment, where platform market power is built upon data control and algorithmic governance.
“To effectively counter monopolistic strategies, competition authorities must develop their own digital platforms for information exchange and coordinated action. What is needed is a form of ‘platformization’ of the regulators themselves — a synchronized system that enables joint responses. This is the only viable way to curb the expanding power of digital giants, commodity traders, and other dominant actors,”
Ivanov concluded.

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Deputy Head of the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) of Russia, Andrey Tsyganov, expressed support for the enhancement of international cooperation and the development of digital resources within antitrust authorities. He emphasized that the UN Model Law on Competition, developed over 30 years ago, requires substantial adaptation to contemporary realities shaped by digitalization, globalization, and global turbulence.
“It is crucial that, over the next five years, we conduct an in-depth discussion within the UNCTAD framework on issues related to cooperation in assessing economic concentration, global value chains, and combating anti-competitive practices. Such efforts are already underway among the competition authorities of BRICS countries,”
Tsyganov added.
Rodrigo Carcamo-Diaz, Chief of Section, Commodities Branch, UNCTAD, highlighted the significant increase in concentration within the agri-food value chain, particularly in the production of fertilizers, seeds, and agrochemicals. This trend, he noted, is driven by the expansion of large corporations and a wave of mergers and acquisitions. For instance, 75% of the global fertilizer market (including potash, phosphate, and nitrogen-based fertilizers) is controlled by a small number of companies headquartered in just a few countries. This high level of market concentration, Cárcamo-Díaz warned, renders the system vulnerable and may have adverse effects on innovation and resilience to external shocks.
He urged competition authorities — especially in developing countries—to strengthen their analytical capabilities and place greater focus on the development of digital agriculture.
“This sector warrants careful antitrust scrutiny — particularly with regard to platform interoperability, data rights, and market concentration in agricultural equipment,”
the UNCTAD representative stated.
Anastasia Nesvetailova, Head, Macroeconomic and Development Policies Branch, UNCTAD, emphasized the growing influence of financialization on global food markets. Of particular concern, she noted, is the dominance of the so-called ABCD group — ADM, Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus — which effectively controls global agricultural trading. Three of these companies do not disclose sufficient information, rendering the sector highly opaque and poorly regulated.
According to Nesvetailova, 70% of transactions on U.S. and European commodity markets today are speculative in nature and disconnected from the real economy. The financial power of commodity traders is increasing, as they evolve into non-bank financial institutions with systemic influence not only on commodity markets but also on global financial stability. Meanwhile, oversight of their operations remains fragmented and ineffective.
“The last time such practices had a systemically destructive impact was in 2007, when an expanding web of debt-driven financial obligations operated largely outside regulatory oversight, ultimately leading to the collapse of the banking system in the U.S. and beyond. A similar scenario could unfold again — this time in the commodity trading sector,”
warned Nesvetailova.
Prof. Eleanor Fox, Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation Emerita, New York University School of Law, underscored the importance of international cooperation — including within the BRICS framework — and called for the collection of comparable data across jurisdictions. She proposed categorizing challenges faced by competition authorities into three areas: the visible (obvious violations and high market concentration), the hidden (emerging forms of coordination, including algorithmic collusion or AI-driven pricing), the comfort zone ( traditional cartel enforcement).
“And my recommendation is that I think we’ve got to go into both. To push both ends of the comfort zone and to go back into the area that’s in plain sight — should we be enjoining there? Should Bunge Viterra have been enjoined? Are we going to find, because of Bunge-Viterra, even more concentration and higher prices? We’ve got to go below that comfort zone line and ask: why are prices going up in areas we’re missing? Why are we losing cases we thought we might win? Or are we simply not getting enough data to bring those cases at all?”
Professor Fox emphasized.
She concluded by urging antitrust agencies to act boldly, rethink their tools and legal frameworks, and align enforcement with today’s complex and rapidly evolving challenges.
Doris Tshepe, Commissioner of the Competition Commission of South Africa, stressed the strategic importance of agriculture for South Africa’s economy and food security. She highlighted the Commission’s efforts in price monitoring, identifying inefficiencies in supply chains, and shared findings from a market inquiry into fresh produce, which uncovered barriers in municipal markets. The inquiry recommended measures to enhance competition and support small-scale producers.
Lukas Cavada, Executive Director for International Affairs, Austrian Federal Competition Authority, provided insights into the current state of the agri-food sector in Austria. He pointed to a stark imbalance: while the sector accounts for more than 6% of the EU’s GDP and supports over 20 million jobs, small producers must contend with powerful transnational processors and retailers.
“Overall, the evolution of the market gives rise to mixed emotions — there are both encouraging developments and missed opportunities,”
Kawada noted.
Ahmed Rahhou, President, Competition Council of Morocco, described the Council’s use of analytical reports as a tool for issuing recommendations to both market participants and public authorities. In Morocco’s agricultural sector, producers receive only 20–30% of the final retail price, with the remainder captured by intermediaries and retailers. This, he argued, reflects a structural imbalance in the value chain.
Rahhou emphasized the need to reform wholesale markets through digitalization, better regulation of intermediaries, and the development of alternative sales channels to reduce the number of links between producers and consumers.
Market power is not confined to the global level — as exemplified by the ABCD group's dominance — but also manifests in national markets, noted Hara Nikolopoulou, Vice President, Hellenic Competition Commission, Greece. Market power can be exerted by sellers over consumers or by buyers over suppliers, both of which threaten public welfare. Consequently, she argued, investigations in the food sector must be grounded in rigorous data analysis.
Nikolopoulou identified three key factors for consideration:inflationary dynamics, which may be short-term (e.g., energy shocks) or long-term (e.g., feed price increases); distortions caused by government interventions, which may generate market failures unrelated to firm conduct; behavioral factors. She gave the example of feta cheese in Greece, where, despite widespread complaints about high prices, consumers consistently chose the most expensive brand.
"This might be true due to information asymmetry. It could be decision fatigue or personal biases, but what we are encountering is behavioral economics. So, what do we do? We publish our results, take on a more informed role, and see what happens."
she explained.
The UN Conference on Competition and Consumer Protection is held once every five years. The event is organized by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and serves as a global platform for discussing and coordinating policies on competition and consumer protection. It brings together representatives from governments, international organizations, academia, and civil society.